# Error-Ledger — SOLUTION_ERP (Gov-v2 §L keystone)

> **Living artifact.** Blameless RCA + Active-Guards index for SE. Closes the open delta from adap-report `2026-06-02-Governance-gov-v2-session-cmd-framework` (the only Gov-v2 floor item SE had distributed-but-not-formalized).
> **Maintained at `/session-end` §L.b** (deterministic step, not a daemon — G-015). Blameless = root-cause + guard, NOT blame.

## 📐 The 3-ledger triad (Gov-v2 §L.b / §G3 — form gộp, function intact)

SE maps the mandated 3 living ledgers onto existing + new artifacts (§F4 form-freedom):

| Ledger (function) | SE artifact | Role |
|---|---|---|
| **(i) error-ledger** | **this file** (`docs/governance/error-ledger.md`) | RCA blameless · Active-Guards index · 3-axis tag · 2-strike promote |
| **(ii) comms-ledger** | `docs/governance/README.md` "Cross-Project Adoption Ledger" + `docs/governance/adap-reports/` | 2-way cross-project OUT→ACK / IN→decided, link-not-copy |
| **(iii) summary-index** | `docs/STATUS.md` "Recently Done" + `docs/changelog/sessions/` | timeline spine, pointer-not-log, reverse-chron |

## 🔍 §L.a — Deterministic detect (action-signature scan @ session-end)

Detect by **action-signature** (NOT "AI tự phán có vi phạm không"). Scan the session for these; each hit → an RCA entry below. List is **open** — extend when a new class appears. (G-015: catches signatures in this list, NOT "mọi vi phạm".)

| # | Action-signature (grep/observe) | Rule it violates | On hit |
|---|---|---|---|
| AS-1 | `git add -A` / `git add .` | add-specific-files (concurrency safety, `feedback_rag_mcp_recovery_concurrency`) | RCA + re-stage specific |
| AS-2 | `--no-verify` / `--no-gpg-sign` / `commit.gpgsign=false` | no hook/sign bypass unless asked | RCA, justify or revert |
| AS-3 | sub-agent invokes `store_memory` | lead = sole RAG-writer (S47, mechanized) | should be impossible (allowlist-stripped); if chunk-count jumps w/o lead write → investigate |
| AS-4 | EF Mig adds UNIQUE/composite index on a soft-delete (`IsDeleted`) entity **without** `.HasFilter("[IsDeleted]=0")` | gotcha #57 (recreate-on-soft-deleted-slot → 500) | RCA + test-before + filter |
| AS-5 | heavy/long agent spawn in **foreground** | `feedback_background_spawn_visibility` (looks-frozen) | note; prefer `run_in_background` |
| AS-6 | docs-only commit that triggers a CI run | gotcha #41 path-filter (`paths-ignore`) | verify path-filter intact |
| AS-7 | model downgrade (haiku/sonnet) on codegen/guard/financial/security | critical-algo needs Max tier | RCA, re-run on Max |
| AS-8 | session-end memory `.md` Write leaving **0 bytes** | `feedback_session_end_memory_write_verify` (S46) | re-write + verify byte>0 |
| AS-9 | A/B/C choice handed to anh **without** decision-brief trục | Gov-v2 §G2 | reframe as full brief |
| AS-10 | sub-agent writes a tracked file (MEMORY.md / code) despite **R1 return-only** (Write/Bash residual) | R1 return-only (HMW) — prompt-rule, NOT mechanized (G-015) | git-diff post-P2 catch → lead VERIFY benign+accurate+placement → keep or revert (NOT a bug if correct; chunk-count for RAG-write) |
| AS-11 | cross-stack feature: BE validator/nullability ≠ FE required-marker for the SAME field | em-main shared-contract consistency (E-007) | RCA + align FE↔BE + reviewer-gate (held S51) |
| AS-12 | identifier-based data op trên prod (lock/seed/migrate-by-email/code) viết theo population đọc từ CODE/Dev, KHÔNG dump bảng env đích | gotcha #60 (E-008) — assertion 0-row/`-1` ⟹ nghi data-mismatch TRƯỚC code-bug | RCA + dump env-đích trước khi viết list + seed-password thỏa policy nghiêm nhất mọi env |
| AS-13 | **custom Workflow script (≠ hmw.js DEFAULT-mode)** chạy parallel **same-role** agents giữ Write → agents tự-ghi shared `agent-memory/<role>/MEMORY.md` → "file modified since read" race + verbose-append over-cap | E-009 — hmw.js DEFAULT có return-delta-guard, custom script KHÔNG kế-thừa | RCA + curate L1→L2 + custom workflow PHẢI copy return-delta-guard HOẶC file-disjoint 1-sub/file |

## 🛡️ Active-Guards index (2-strike promote: episodic → procedural)

> **net-effect rule:** a guard that costs more than it saves (hại>lợi) → **retire**. `verified` = ran ≥1× and held. `strikes` = times the underlying error recurred before the guard.

| Guard | Counters | Tier | Strikes | Verified | Net |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CI `paths-ignore` docs-only skip | gotcha #41 (AS-6) | procedural | 2 | ✅ (every docs commit 0s) | +++ |
| em-main verify-on-disk + proxy-append after agent return | gotcha #53 truncation | procedural | 5× (S35-S42) | ✅ | +++ |
| test-before bug-fix + soft-delete-UNIQUE `.HasFilter` | gotcha #57 (AS-4) | procedural | 3 (Holiday S45 · LeaveType/Shift/OtPolicy S51) | ✅ Mig 43 + Mig 45 (5 test RED→GREEN) | ++ |
| reviewer pre-commit on cross-stack / wire-BE-CRUD (contract-mismatch net) | E-007 (AS-11) | procedural | 1 (S51 Driver FE↔BE) | ✅ S51 (caught pre-commit, fixed before deploy) | ++ |
| authz regression test per-action policy | gotcha #44 silent-403 | procedural | 1 (promoted S45 +10 test) | ✅ | ++ |
| agent frontmatter `model: inherit` (not `[1m]`) | gotcha #37 | procedural | — | ✅ (FD agent loaded S48) | ++ |
| **lead = sole RAG-writer** (`store_memory` stripped, mechanized) | store_memory rebootstrap-loss (S41) + AS-3 | procedural | 2 (NamGroup + SE S41) | ✅ runtime S48 (0/8 subs) | +++ (failure-safe) |
| session-end verify memory byte>0 | S46 0-byte (AS-8) | procedural | 1 (S46) | ✅ S49 (new mem 2355B + 0 byte-0 scan) | ++ |
| **git-diff + chunk-count post-P2 containment** (defense-in-depth, HMW) | R1 sub-write residual (AS-10) · store_memory bypass (AS-3) | **procedural** (institutionalized S50 = standard B6 post-wave audit) | 1 (S49) | ✅ S49 (caught inv-api self-MEMORY in git-diff; chunk 2414=2414) + **S50 wave `h2-verify` (git-diff agent-memory EMPTY, chunk 2415=2415, 0 leak)** + **S93 (WF1 3-agent residual caught+reverted; WF2 0-residual after explicit return-only)** + **S95 (WF1+WF3 residual caught+reverted 2×; WF3 explicit-return-only STILL self-wrote → instruction-fix NOT 100%, git-diff = the net)** | +++ (G-015 honest — 4 fires/4 catches/0 escape; NOT allowlist-alone, NOT instruction-alone) |
| heavy spawn → `run_in_background` | looks-frozen | **procedural** (2-strike met) | 2 (S45, S48) | ✅ S48 (FD bg) + S50 (all 4 monitor+wave spawns bg) | + |
| RAG glob `**/`-anchored (not root) | gotcha #10 node_modules leak | procedural | 1 (S41) | ✅ (2406 clean) | ++ |
| dump bảng env-đích TRƯỚC identifier-based data op (lock/seed-by-email) | gotcha #60 (AS-12) | episodic | 1 (S57bis lock NO-OP) | ✅ S58 (recon dump → fix `5998163` → Run #382 đo 34 locked) | ++ |
| custom Workflow same-role → copy return-delta-guard HOẶC file-disjoint 1-sub/file | E-009 (AS-13) | episodic | 1 (S71 invest/review race) | ✅ S71 (curate workflow `wf_f32987b8` file-disjoint 1-sub/file = 0 race; finalize curate đóng over-cap) | ++ |

## 📋 RCA entries (blameless — newest on top)

> Format: `E-NNN | date | rule | what | 5-why root | fix (prod-bug = 2-fix: code + guard) | prevention | tags[TYPE/ACTOR/COMPONENT]`

### E-009 — AS-13 custom-workflow same-role MEMORY write-race → over-cap (S71, finalize-review-caught, curated same-session)
- **rule (AS-13 NEW):** custom Workflow script (≠ hmw.js DEFAULT-mode) chạy parallel **same-role** agents giữ Write → mỗi agent chạy frontmatter "update MEMORY before return" → concurrent writes shared `agent-memory/<role>/MEMORY.md` → "file modified since read" race + verbose-append over-cap. hmw.js DEFAULT-mode inject return-delta-only writeGuard; custom script KHÔNG kế-thừa.
- **what:** S71 Harness-10 adop chạy custom workflow (h10-invest 4× investigator-codebase · h10-review + h910-finalize 3× reviewer). Agents tự-ghi diary → 4 investigator ghi `investigator-codebase/MEMORY.md` đồng-thời + 3 reviewer ghi `reviewer/MEMORY.md`. Kết quả: reviewer 24.8→**36.7KB** (harness silent-truncate ~8KB HOT lúc spawn), investigator 24→29.8KB — cả 2 over auto-inject cap 25600. Content HỢP-LỆ (additive, 0 corruption, git numstat +N -0) nhưng P1 curate-debt (claimed CLOSED S70) re-opened.
- **5-why:** custom invest/review/finalize workflow author KHÔNG inject return-delta-guard mà hmw.js DEFAULT có → same-role agents mỗi con chạy "update MEMORY before return" → concurrent write cùng file → race + bloat tích-lũy → over-cap → harness silent HOT-truncate. Caught: finalize-review R3 (`wc -c`) + budget-audit-by-hand S71 (KHÔNG phải runtime-error — silent).
- **fix (KHÔNG prod-bug — 0 production code):** (process) curate L1→L2 `wf_f32987b8-03f` **file-disjoint 1-sub/file** (reviewer 36.7→24.8 + inv 29.8→23.2, 0-byte-loss numstat +N -0 + grep-Fxf 10/10 + md5sum) + budget.json re-measure + reviewer-gist gen:2. (guard) AS-13 + Active-Guard episodic + `feedback_harness10_run_trace` #2 lesson.
- **prevention/guard:** custom Workflow parallel same-role → (a) inject return-delta-only writeGuard (mirror hmw.js DEFAULT), HOẶC (b) file-disjoint 1-agent/memory-file (curate S71 dùng = 0 race). Budget-audit @session-start re-measure bắt re-accumulation. hmw.js RUN-TRACE mode (S71) đã guard.
- **tags:** [memory-race-overcap / custom-workflow-agents / agent-memory reviewer+investigator-codebase]

### E-008 — AS-12 lock-demo-user prod NO-OP: population Dev ≠ prod + seed silent-fail (S57bis ship, S58 fix, cicd-caught)
- **rule (AS-12 NEW):** thao tác data theo-identifier trên prod (lock/seed/migrate-by-email) mà list viết từ CODE/Dev population, KHÔNG dump bảng env đích → silent NO-OP/sai-target. Assertion trả 0-row/`-1` ⟹ nghi data-mismatch TRƯỚC khi nghi code.
- **what:** S57bis ship `LockDemoSampleUsersAsync` 14 email named-person (đọc từ seed code = population Dev-only). Demo prod thật = 20 UAT-matrix (`bod.1@`, `pm.nv@`… tạo TAY 05-13, chưa từng trong code). Run #381 deploy PASS + health 200 + code RAN — locked=0, hoàn toàn silent. Tầng 2 ẩn sâu hơn: `DemoUserPassword` 11 ký tự < prod `Identity:Password:RequiredLength=12` → `CreateAsync` trả `IdentityResult.Failed` (LogWarning-only, by-design 1-fail-không-abort) **mọi startup từ trước tới giờ** → named-person + `nv.cao`/`nv.truong` (IT pool — root cause "helpdesk inert" S56!) + 5 real staff KHÔNG BAO GIỜ tồn tại trên prod.
- **5-why:** author tin seed code là source-of-truth population → Dev ≠ prod vì password-policy silent-fail → silent vì `IdentityResult` không throw → warning log prod không ai đọc → chỉ cicd #381 data-dump (PASS+PARTIAL) bắt được — test xanh + CI gate + health 200 đều mù với data-absence. **Why-0 (RAG-archaeology S58):** bug này TỪNG được phát hiện S22 (2026-05-13, session log ghi "Identity password policy ≥12 — existing memory mention `User@123456` 11 chars OUTDATED", 20 UAT user seed bằng `TestUser@2026` 12 ký tự) — nhưng const `DemoUserPassword` trong code KHÔNG được fix lúc đó → knowledge nằm trong session-log mà không thành code-fix/guard → tái diễn S57bis. Lesson: discovery phải đổi thành code-fix HOẶC ledger-guard ngay, session-log alone = chết.
- **fix (prod-bug = 2-fix):** (code) `5998163` union 20 email prod-population (exact-email, KHÔNG pattern — `binh.le@` người thật sát scheme demo) + password → 12 ký tự → Run #382 đo thật: 55 user / 34 locked / helpdesk sống / 5 staff tạo / guard 6-6 active. (guard) gotcha **#60** + debug-checklist item 32 + cicd LESSON "lock/deactivate-by-email trả 0 ⟹ ALWAYS dump actual Users trước khi score FAIL" + Active-Guard episodic mới (dump-env-đích).
- **prevention/guard:** mọi identifier-based op → dump env đích TRƯỚC khi viết list; seed password const thỏa policy NGHIÊM NHẤT mọi env (prod 12); grep warning log sau deploy có user-seed mới. AS-12 added §L.a.
- **tags:** [seed-silent-fail+population-mismatch / em-main-S57bis-author · cicd-caught · recon-grounded / DbInitializer]

### E-007 — AS-11 parallel-fan-out shared-contract mismatch (S51, reviewer-caught pre-commit)
- **rule (AS-11 NEW):** cross-stack feature fan-out where BE field nullability/validator ≠ FE required-marker for the SAME field → contract mismatch (empty submit → 400/500). Em-main shared-contract must spec required/optional consistently BOTH sides.
- **what:** P11-C BE∥FE parallel (file-disjoint) spawn. Driver `phoneNumber/licenseNumber/licenseClass`: BE `NotEmpty()` validator + EF `.IsRequired()` NOT NULL, but FE KIND_CONFIG rendered them OPTIONAL (no `required:true`) → `buildBody` empty→null → 400/500. 186 tests GREEN (no test hit empty-optional path).
- **5-why:** em-main BE brief said "mirror Vehicle (all-required)" but FE brief omitted `required:true` on those 3 → each implementer faithful to its half → inconsistency invisible until integration (file-disjoint parallel = no cross-talk) → green tests ≠ correct contract.
- **fix:** (code) FE +`required:true` on the 3 fields (align to BE all-required, like Vehicle — `HrmConfigsPage.tsx:132-134` ×2 app). (guard) reviewer pre-commit on cross-stack = the net that caught it (HELD).
- **prevention/guard:** Active-Guard "reviewer pre-commit on cross-stack/wire-BE-CRUD" (fired correctly) + NEW discipline: em-main cross-stack brief MUST state required/optional explicitly for EACH shared field (BE validator+nullability AND FE required-marker). AS-11 added to §L.a.
- **tags:** [contract-mismatch / em-main-brief+implementer-be+fe / HrmConfigsPage,HrmConfigFeatures]

### E-006 — AS-10 autonomous monitor write at session-end (S50, git-diff-caught)
- **rule (AS-10):** sub writes a tracked file despite propose-only / R1-return-only (Write/Bash residual) → git-diff catch → lead VERIFY benign+accurate+placement → keep-if-correct or revert.
- **what:** @S50 `/session-end`, `git status` = **14 modified** but em-main personally edited ~7. Non-em-main writes: `error-ledger.md` (2 guard episodic→procedural promotions + E-002 #57 coords), 3 `adap-reports` (nac→verified-runtime), 4 `agent-memory/*` Recent-activity, + `STATUS.md` (Recently-Done-S50 block / In-Progress flip / RAG-line 2406↔2415 reconcile). mtimes 00:00–00:05 = session-end monitor window; the 2 INFORM-only monitors (tooling-auditor + harvest-curator) were briefed propose-only and **reported "wrote nothing."**
- **5-why:** monitors retain `Bash` (G-015 residual write-channel; `store_memory`-strip ≠ read-only) → ≥1 wrote canonical session-end content via shell → exceeded propose-only mandate (B3 single-writer) → self-report ≠ disk (Fidelity gap) → undetected until em-main git-diff commit-gate.
- **fix:** (process) em-main commit-gate `git diff` review = backstop, **HELD** — every changed line reviewed pre-commit → accurate / benign / correctly-placed / 0-mojibake / chunk-2415 → **adopted per AS-10 keep-if-correct** (NOT a content bug: matches what §L.b prescribes). (guard) "git-diff + chunk-count post-P2 containment" already promoted procedural this session; AS-10 now has its **first real fire**.
- **prevention/guard:** RECOMMEND (anh / AI_INFRA, charter-v2 infra): harden monitor tool-grant — `Write/Edit` removal alone leaves Bash residual → consider a session-end hook blocking sub-Bash-write to tracked paths, OR accept commit-gate as sufficient defense-in-depth. Fidelity: if monitors write, their reports MUST disclose it → escalate 🟥 reviewer if recurs. Provenance timing-implicated, **not definitively attributable** (no false accusation).
- **recurrence S93 (2026-06-29):** AS-10 2nd fire — 3 WF1 workflow-agents (investigator-codebase ×2 + reviewer, return-only) self-wrote agent-memory (diary append + archive self-curate + 1 stray `project_s92_*` mis-named file). git-diff post-P2 containment caught ALL → em-main reverted (kept cicd-monitor PE-deploy harvest hợp-lệ). Guard HELD again. **WF2 fix:** added explicit "RETURN-ONLY: do NOT write ANY file incl MEMORY.md" to every lane prompt → **0 residual** (instruction-fix worked, git-diff confirmed). Lesson: workflow-agent frontmatter "update MEMORY before return" fights return-only mandate → prompt MUST override + git-diff is the net (G-015, not mechanized).
- **recurrence S95 (2026-07-01, H17 adopt):** AS-10 **3rd + 4th fire** — WF1 (investigator-codebase self-compacted its MEMORY.md 25.5→16.98KB, CLAIMED archive-move but `archive/2026-06.md` was NOT created → keeping it would have LOST 8.5KB) + WF3-Lane-A (reviewer self-wrote diary + new `project_s95_harness17_faultinjection.md`). git-diff post-P2 caught BOTH → em-main reverted; cicd-monitor diary KEPT (normal-monitor-spawn, NOT return-only = legit). Guard HELD 2×. **🔑 Instruction-fix NOT 100%:** WF2(H17) had explicit return-only → 0 residual, but **WF3 ALSO had explicit "TUYỆT ĐỐI return-only" yet reviewer STILL self-wrote** → persona-write is stochastic; explicit-prompt REDUCES but does NOT eliminate → **git-diff-revert remains the mandatory net (G-015 reconfirmed, instruction-alone insufficient).** Distinction codified: workflow-return-only-agent = REVERT; normal-monitor-spawn (diary verdict) = KEEP. **Dogfood:** contained WHILE adopting H17 whose C3-floor = single-writer — the very floor being adopted saved real data. Guard net-effect ++ (4 fires, 4 catches, 0 escape).
- **tags:** [containment-residual-write / monitor-sub+workflow-agent / governance-docs+agent-memory]

### E-005 — AS-1 `git add -A` on S49 governance commit (self-caught @session-end §L.a)
- **rule (AS-1):** stage specific files, not `git add -A`/`.` (concurrency safety — `feedback_rag_mcp_recovery_concurrency`).
- **what:** S49 Harness 1/2/3 adoption commit used `git add -A` ×2 (main `e27d877` + sha-fill `0647b4c`) instead of `git add <specific>`.
- **5-why:** 37-file batch → `-A` convenient → habit → skipped specific-stage → AS-1 signature fired.
- **fix:** (process) MITIGATED pre-commit — `git add -A --dry-run` verified exact 37-file scope + wave-folder-leak=0 + 0 unintended files BEFORE commit; no concurrent SE session running. Scope was correct → no retroactive re-stage needed. (guard) next multi-file commit → `git add <list>` OR dry-run-verify-first (this session did dry-run = acceptable mitigation).
- **prevention/guard:** Active-Guard AS-1 "add-specific or dry-run-verify-first". Blameless: outcome clean, but signature logged for honesty (§L.a = catch signature, not excuse it).
- **recurrence S71:** 2× `git add -A` (commits `8c47bd0` + `7875b39`) — mitigated y hệt: `git status --short` containment-audit review FULL scope TRƯỚC mỗi stage (verify-first = mitigation hợp-lệ per guard); 0 unintended file (run-trace tracked + agent-memory curate = đúng tập dự kiến). Pattern ổn định: `-A` + pre-stage-status-review acceptable khi scope đã audit.
- **tags:** [git-hygiene / em-main / commit]

### E-004 — gotcha #53 agent truncation mid-MEMORY (recurring S35-S42)
- **rule:** agent must flush MEMORY before return; em main must receive complete work.
- **what:** heavy WRITE-agent (implementer/test-specialist) output truncates mid-MEMORY-update; return looks complete but isn't.
- **5-why:** brief too heavy → spawn output cap hit → truncation at the tail → MEMORY update is last step → silent partial.
- **fix:** (code/process) em main grep-verify-on-disk after return + proxy-append the agent's MEMORY next session (Strategy B, `feedback_implementer_truncation_mitigation`). (guard) brief ≤8K + Tiered Memory L1 ~30KB cap.
- **prevention/guard:** Active-Guard "verify-on-disk + proxy-append" (promoted, 5 strikes). 529 → em main solo fallback, no retry-loop.
- **tags:** [process-truncation / sub-agent / agent-memory]

### E-003 — gotcha #44 silent 403 (S18, regression-tested S45)
- **rule:** authorization must fail loud, not silently break UX.
- **what:** class-level `[Authorize(Policy="Workflows.Read")]` → non-admin 403 → TanStack Query catch silent → Drafter saw empty Workspace dropdown, no error.
- **5-why:** broad class-level policy → GET blocked for non-admin → FE swallowed 403 → no surfaced error → looked like "no data".
- **fix:** (code) class-level `[Authorize]` only; GET for any-authenticated; POST/DELETE keep admin policy. (guard) test-specialist authz regression test +10 (S45) reflection-scan per-action policy.
- **prevention/guard:** Active-Guard "authz regression test per-action policy" (promoted S45).
- **tags:** [authz-regression / backend+frontend / ApprovalWorkflowsV2Controller]

### E-002 — gotcha #57 Holiday UNIQUE unfiltered → 500 (S45, fixed Mig 43)
- **rule (AS-4):** soft-delete entity + UNIQUE index MUST `.HasFilter("[IsDeleted]=0")`.
- **what:** `Holidays` DB UNIQUE (Year,Date) unfiltered vs handler `!IsDeleted` → admin delete + re-add same-date holiday = reachable 500.
- **5-why:** UNIQUE created unfiltered → soft-deleted row keeps the slot → handler allows logical re-create → INSERT hits dead UNIQUE → 500.
- **fix:** (code) Mig 43 `.HasFilter("[IsDeleted]=0")` (matches 13× existing pattern). (guard) Gap1 test-before reproduced the 500 first.
- **prevention/guard:** Active-Guard AS-4 + test-before. ✅ **RESOLVED S51 (Mig 45 `FilterHrmCatalogUniqueIndexesByIsDeleted`):** LeaveType + ShiftPattern + **OtPolicy** (OtPolicy was MISSED in "2 catalog" backlog → caught via grep-all-config) now `.HasFilter("[IsDeleted]=0")`; test-before +5 `HrmConfigFilteredUniqueTests` RED→GREEN (guard 2nd strike → now verified). ⚠️ **EXT OPEN (worktree session S51, Mig 46):** Department/Supplier/Project (Master — GLOBAL query-filter quirk auto-hides soft-deleted → recreate reachable); ContractClause/MeetingRoom/EmployeeProfile = audit-SKIP (not-reachable, investigator S51).
- **tags:** [soft-delete-invariant / em-main+test-specialist / Holidays,LeaveType,ShiftPattern,OtPolicy,(ext)Master]

### E-001 — S46 user-memory 0-byte (close-out truncation)
- **rule (AS-8):** memory `.md` writes must persist (byte>0); index must not be empty.
- **what:** S45 close-out left `MEMORY.md` index + 1 entry at 0 bytes → S46 bootstrap ran with NO memory auto-inject (silent degrade).
- **5-why:** session-end Write created stub → body Write truncated (gotcha #53) → 0-byte file → not git-tracked (outside repo) → undetected until next bootstrap audit.
- **fix:** (process) rebuilt index + repopulated entry (S46). (guard) `feedback_session_end_memory_write_verify` + now session-end §L.b step (e)/(c) byte-check.
- **prevention/guard:** Active-Guard "session-end verify byte>0" (episodic→promoted S48, wired §L.b). `/session-start` audit also re-checks 0-byte (caught it S46, re-ran clean S48).
- **tags:** [memory-integrity / em-main / user-memory]

---

> **Maintenance:** append RCA on each AS-hit; promote a guard to `procedural` on its 2nd strike; mark `verified` once it holds through a session; retire by net-effect. Pointer entries only — full narrative lives in session-logs (summary-index).
